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This paper deeply analyzes the characteristics of corrupters during consultation in the Douala public 
hospitals, as well as the amounts of bribe they pay. A survey of patients in these hospitals reveals that 
the majority of bribes paid during consultation is between 1,000 and 3,000 CFA Francs, interval 
which corresponds to the 25
th
 and 75
th
 percentile of the amounts of bribe paid respectively. Our 
estimates indicate that for the amounts of bribe paid falling within this interval, it appears that the rich, 
the women, the older and the more educated are more likely to corrupt practices. However, when such 
amounts are set outside of that interval, the amounts of bribe paid and the characteristics of corrupters 
are no more the same as before. This contradicts for instance to some extent some theoretical results 
that do not include the setting of the level of bribe. It  finally emerges from our analysis that with 
regard to each of the characteristics highlighted, correspond specific amounts of bribe paid, which are 
related to the socio-professional and socio-demographic categories of patients. In particular, senior 
staffs and business men / contractors would be most likely to pay bribes, whatever the amount.     
 
Keywords: Bribery, Prevalence rate, Odds ratio, Percentile, Health services, Cameroon. 
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1. Introduction 
The empirical literature on corruption has identified the causes and consequences of the phenomenon in the 
health sector in many countries. Gupta et al. (2002) established from a study based on 71 countries, that the countries 
highly affected by corruption showed the highest infant mortality rates than others, even after adjustment based on 
income, girls' schooling, health spending and urbanization. Mauro (2002) showed that corrupt countries spend less on 
education and health. In the same vein, Lavallee et al. (2010) highlighted in a study of 18 countries that corruption 
would lead to a reduction of public expenses in health, education and social protection sectors. 
The works of this literature are important because they have led to a better understanding of corruption in the health 
sector and, consequently, to the proposal of relevant measures against the phenomenon. For instance, there is 
evidence that by increasing the transparency and obligation to give account in public health services, the level of 
corruption will decrease (Vian, 2008). However, these works have at least one shortcoming because they do not 
inform us about the corrupt exchanges practiced between caregivers and patients. Indeed, these works explore the 
Transparency International corruption indexes (TI), those of the Political Risk Services / International Country Risk 
Guide (PRS / ICRG) and those of the World Wide Governance Indicators (W.W.G.I) of the World Bank, which 
derived from the surveys made from investors plying the world's countries, but who are not in touch with health care 
personnel in public hospitals of those countries.  
Yet, in recent years, the availability of microeconomic data (from companies and households) on corruption 
provides the opportunity to better understand the causes and consequences of the phenomenon. However, up to date, 
and despite a recent commitment, microeconomic studies on this topic remain limited, and confined to certain 
geographical areas such as the Eastern Europe (Balabanova and McKee, 2002; Lewis, 2002) and Latin America 
(Hunt, 2004; Hunt and Lazlo, 2005; Seligson, 2006). Although Africa is one of the world’s areas where corruption is 
very acute, very few microeconomic studies on this phenomenon are devoted to this continent. Certainly, thanks to 
the Afro-barometer project based on surveys of households conducted in 18 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, works 
on this theme have being multiplied. These works relate in particular to the relationship between corruption and trust, 
or satisfaction in public institutions (Bratton, 2007; Cho and Kirwin, 2007; Lavallee et al., 2010). But this project has 
at least one gap. It omits some African countries, which however, are sometimes classified among the most corrupt 
countries of the world. It is the case of Cameroon which ranked first of corrupt countries successively in 1998 and 
1999.                 
In Cameroon, the National Institute of Statistics (Institut National De La Statistique, 2011) studied, from a 
survey of households in 2007, corrupt practices in the health sector. This study is important because it helps to know 
that annually, each patient pays an average bribe amounting to 1,089 CFA Francs for consultation and medical care. 
But it is limited insofar as it does not inform us neither on socio-demographic characteristics (age, education, gender, 
income) of such a patient, nor about different amounts of bribe he/she pays. The purpose of this study is therefore to 
fill this gap, as part of a field survey
1
 conducted among 407 patients in public hospitals of the city of Douala in 
Cameroon. According to this survey, the majority of bribes paid during consultation is between 1,000 CFA Francs 
and 3,000F CFA, amounts representing respectively the bribes corresponding to the 25
th
 and the 75
th
 percentile of the 
amounts paid. This interval which represents not only the modal class, but also the median and the mean class, was 
used as reference to highlight the characteristics of individuals who pay bribes not only in amounts below and above 
these percentiles, but also those in this interval.                            
In general, the theoretical literature suggests that holders of low incomes, young people and women are 
respectively less exposed to corrupt practices than holders of higher incomes, older people and men (Lavallee et al., 
2010). However, the results obtained in this study rather discuss those presented by the theoretical literature because 
by setting the amounts of bribes paid below or beyond the above mentioned percentiles, individuals’ characteristics 
vary depending on the set percentile. Thus, if for example we take income into account, theoretical expectations are 
more or less verified by our results, insofar as when the bribe amount is set beyond the 75
th
 percentile, holders of 
250,000 CFA Francs income and less, will tend to pay more bribes to a certain amount (under 1,000 CFA Francs) 
than those with a higher income of 250,000 CFA Francs; on the contrary, if the amount of bribe paid is set beyond 
the 25
th
 percentile, it is rather the holders of income of more than 250,000 CFA Francs who will tend to pay bribes of 
a different amount (less than 3,000 CFA Francs). In principle, it was expected that the same trend be observed 
regardless of the amount of bribe paid, which unfortunately is not the case.    
The purpose of such a study therefore lies in the fact that not only it allows to identify the profile of those most 
exposed to the phenomenon, but also, it constitutes a basis for the proposal of the most appropriate anti-corruption 
measures. Because of the secret nature of corruption (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993) many researchers discuss the 
characteristics of people who are often victims of the phenomenon without mentioning the amounts. On the contrary, 
this study presents, analyzes and discusses these amounts. The inclusion of the latter is particularly important as in 
some countries, they are socially acceptable and justified as a way to compensate public health professionals who are 
poorly paid, or it is an understandable reaction from people who might have an urgent need of health care (Savedoff 
and Hussmann, 2006).    
The second section briefly presents the Cameroonian health system while highlighting the causes and corrupt 
practices. The implemented methodology and the description of characteristics of the sample used form the basis of 
part three. As for Section four, its models while considering the characteristics of patients victims of the 
phenomenon. The results of different estimates obtained are discussed in section five, and section six concludes the 
presentation.   
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1Survey funded by the African Economic Research Consortium in Nairobi, Kenya in 2009  
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2. Health, Health Care and Corruption in Cameroonian Hospitals 
2.1. Health and Health Care       
During the last two decades, Cameroonian populations have made some progress in the evolution of their health 
status as shown by some indicators, including the infant mortality rate(IMR), the neonatal mortality rate(NMR) and 
the juvenile mortality rate (JMR) shown in the Table below. 
 
Table-1. Douala Health indicators (1990-2011) 
  1991 1998 2004 2011 2015
2
 
Neonatal mortality rate(per 1,000births) 
Cameroon  33,1 37,2 29 31  
Douala  36 28,3 30 33  
Rural zone  42,9 44,3 37 35  
Infant mortality rate(per 1,000births) 
Cameroon  65 77,0 74 62 75,6 
Douala  67,2 51,5 55 54  
Rural zone  86,1 86,9 91 77  
Juvenile mortality rate(per 1,000births) 
Cameroon  65,6 79,9 75 63  
Douala  38,6 41,9 40 23  
Rural zone  79,7 80,2 85 82  
Maternal mortality rate(100,000 births) Cameroon  454 430 669 782 344 
       Sources: INS (1991; 1998; 2004; 2011) 
  
In this table, the neonatal mortality rate as well as the infant mortality rate has dropped from 1991 to 2011 
respectively from 36 to 33 per thousand, and from 38.6 to 23 per thousand for the city of Douala. At the same time, 
the neonatal mortality rate has dropped from 36 per thousand to 33 per thousand. In the whole country, these rates 
decreased from 33.1 to 31 between 1991 and 2011 for the neonatal mortality rate, and from 65 to 62 during the same 
period for the infant mortality rate. These improvements, however, are still insufficient, due in part to malfunctions 
of the offer of services in public hospitals.  
In Cameroon, the health sector comprises three sub-sectors: the public, the private and the traditional. In general, 
the public sub-sector is the most important because not only it is the major provider of medical services, but in 
addition, it regulates all activities related to it. Unfortunately, this sub-sector does not have sufficient human and 
material resources to meet the demand for care. For instance, as far the personnel is concerned, public hospitals in 
Douala have an average of eight medical doctors for a population of 159,211 inhabitants, that is, 19,901 inhabitants 
per doctor (Institut National De La Statistique, 2010). The WHO’s (World Health Organization) standard is one 
medical doctor per 10,000 inhabitants. Compared to this standard, every doctor is required to accommodate on 
average a surplus of 4,211 patients. These doctors are therefore overworked. Moreover, in early 1990, civil servants’ 
salaries, including those of health workers, have been reduced by over 50%. Wage increases of about 5%, 15% and 
5% made meanwhile did not allow these workers to recover their former purchasing power. Impoverished employees 
have therefore turned to the corrupt maneuvers to try to improve their living conditions. 
Thus, following the Bamako Initiative
3
, the government adopted a new policy based on the decentralization of 
service delivery, focusing on primary health care and the participation of beneficiary communities to the financing 
and management of public health services establishments, given the virtual absence of health insurance. Since then, 
households
4
 must pay for the services officially offered to them in public hospitals. To these official payments are 
added some irregular payments. 
  
2.2. Corruption in Health Services 
Access to basic social services including health is a constant concern for the Cameroonian public authorities. But 
the efforts that they are making, with the support of development partners to facilitate access to these services, are 
unfortunately affected by corruption. Indeed, after ECAM3
5, nearly 85% of households’ heads living in urban and 
semi-urban areas feel that the level of corruption in the health sector is high in this country. But the magnitude of the 
phenomenon varies from one region to another (69.8% to 61.1% in Douala and Yaoundé). For example, during 
consultation, corruption occurs mainly through the payment of non-regulatory fees and through the interventions of 
personalities to be quickly served and avoid waiting for a long time (INS, 2011). Patients in public hospitals also 
complain of the unavailability of medical doctors. This unavailability can be explained by the fact that private health 
facilities that accompany the government in the offer of health services to populations mostly have as promoters, 
medical doctors working in the public sector. Many patients who visit public health facilities are oriented by these 
doctors to their private health centers for their medical care.  
Therefore, being interviewed on their perception of the level of corruption in the health sector as parts of the 
households’ survey in 2007, almost six out of ten households in the city of Douala believe it is high. This reflects a 
general malaise. As a matter of fact, if access to basic social services including health is a constant concern for public 
authorities, corruption in the health sector is like a gangrene which tends to negate the efforts made by the State 
(INS, 2011).  
 
 
 
                                                          
2 Projection 
3The Bamako Initiative is the result of the summit as WHO and UNICEF in collaboration with African countries held in 1987 in Bamako. 
4This policy certainly has the advantage of increasing the necessary resources for the functioning of these hospitals. But it has the disadvantage to oust the less 
rich households of the public health services market. 
5
 ECAM3 is the last   Cameroonian household surveys conducted  seven years ago 
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3. Methodology and Descriptive Statistics  
To highlight the characteristics of patients who pay bribes during consultation in the Douala public hospitals, we 
initially determined the sample’s size of individuals to interview and then, through odds ratios, we established a 
typology of patients’ characteristics whose bribe amounts are below and above the 25th and 75th percentiles, given 
that each of the percentiles was previously set. A typology of patients’ characteristics whose bribe amounts are inside 
the modal class, that’s to say, between the 25th and 75th percentile, given the socio-professional category of the 
victim, has also been highlighted. 
 
3.1. Determining the Sample  
As we were unable to determine an approximate P value through a prior survey (because to our knowledge, no 
investigation about corruption in public hospitals has yet been carried out in Cameroon), that is to say, the proportion 
of respondents in the context of a preliminary study, we set P to 0.5, this value representing the worst case, that is to 
say, the value which gives the greatest possible standard deviation for the sampling distribution of  P  . In this case, 
the required sample size to ensure a margin error E (in absolute value) not exceeding 5% with a confidence level of 
95% will be about (Baillargeon, 1989):  
2 2 2
/ 2 / 2
2 2 2
(0,5)(0,5) (1,96)
384...................(1)
4 4(0,05)
Z Z
n
E E
     
E: the error margin; Z: the standard normal distribution;   : The estimator of P in the preliminary study. The 
distribution of the number of individuals to be interviewed is done from the number of medical and paramedical staff 
in each hospital selected as shown in the table below: 
 
Table-2. The distribution of the number of patients to be interviewed by hospital. 
 Hospital Staff Number 
Importance of the 
hospital (in %) 
Number of patients to 
be  interviewed 
Laquintinie 630 41 157 
General  326 21 81 
New-Bell 113 7 27 
Bonassama 103 7 25 
Cite des Palmiers 100 6 25 
Deido 84 5 21 
Logbaba 80 5 20 
Nylon 62 4 15 
Bonamoussadi 57 4 14 
Total 1 555 100 384 
                      Source: Our estimates based on information collected at the Regional Health Delegation of Littoral on the number of hospitals 
 
The first column describes the type of hospital, the second column the total number of medical and paramedical 
staff, the third indicates the weight or importance of the personnel of each hospital as compared to the staff of all the 
hospitals in general, and the last column, the approximate number of people who should be interviewed by hospital, 
based on the weight of each hospital. We came up with a total of 384 interviewees. For prudence sake, we distributed 
415 questionnaires with the assumption that all incorrectly completed questionnaires would be eliminated, this to 
help approximately achieve the sample’s size. Thus, 407 questionnaires were filled out correctly and therefore 
validated. It is on the basis of these 407 questionnaires that the analysis was performed. 
 
3.2. Some Descriptive Statistics  
Following the questioning of 407 patients, we obtained by hospital the average amounts of bribe, as well as the 
prevalence rates of the phenomenon. 
 
3.2.1. Characteristics of the Sample 
The table below specifies the characteristics of the patients’ sample: age, school level (education), income, 
marital and employment status (Yamb and Bayemi, 2015): 
Regarding the age characteristic, it has been split into two categories: young people between 20 and 40 years old 
and the old over forty years old. This nomenclature at the age level reflects the country's socio-economic situation as 
concerns employment insofar as four years ago, authorities launched a recruitment campaign in the public sector for 
the youth (25,000 in total), thus considering as young any person aged forty and less. The income characteristic also 
obeys to this dualistic nomenclature, that is, those with an income of 250, 000 CFA Francs and less, and those who 
earn more than 250,000 CFA Francs. This classification took into account the socio-economic characteristics of the 
respondents
6
 . This choice is justified by the fact that initially, we considered four classes of income namely less than 
75,000, between 75,000 and 150,000, from 150, 000 to 250,000 and the class of more than 250,000. It is worth 
mentioning that among the 407 respondents, almost 83% have an income of 250,000 and less, and only about17% 
earn more than 250,000.This latter percentage represents the senior staffs in companies and businessmen/contractors, 
who are considered in the Cameroonian environment as people belonging to the richest social class. 80% of the first 
mentioned earn more than 250 thousands CFA Francs, and nearly 50% of the second category as much, hence the 
justification for the classification in terms of income distribution in the two categories, that is, 250,000 and under, 
and above 250,000. This is also applied to the education variable where two categories were retained: higher level 
and no higher level 
 
                                                          
6In the Appendix is presented the table of income levels based on socio-professional categories 
P
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Table-3. The characteristics of patients’ sample 
 Male Female Total % Male % Female Total % 
Age       
 40 years old and Less  134 190 324 41,4 58,6 100 
  More than 40 years old 52 31 83 62,7 37,3 100 
Education       
Primary and secondary Education 97 145 242 40,1 59,2 100 
Higher Education  89 76 165 53,9 46,1 100 
Average monthly Income       
Less than 75, 000  CFA Francs 78 106 184 42,4 57,6 100 
Between  75,000 and  150, 000 48 52 100 48 52 100 
Between 150,000 and 250, 000 26 28 54 48 52 100 
 More than  250,000 35 34 69 50,7 49,3 100 
Matrimonial Status       
Married 72 99 171 42,1 57,9 100 
Single  74 82 156 47,4 52,6 100 
Divorced 10 9 19 52,6 47,4 100 
Other  30 31 61 49,2 50,8 100 
Socio-professional Category         
Senior staff  17 7 24 70,8 29,2 100 
Control Agent  21 14 35 60 40 100 
Enforcement officer 22 15 37 59,5 40,5 100 
Contractor  (Business man) 25 4 29 86,2 13,8 100 
House Wives  55 55  100 100 
Trader  25 42 67 37,3 62,7 100 
Unemployed  30 29 59 50,8 49,2 100 
Others  (informal) 46 55 101 45,5 54,5 100 
Total  186 221 407 45,7 54,3 100 
       Source: Our Surveys’ Results 
 
3.2.2. Average Amount of Bribes Paid During Consultation in Public Hospitals 
The diagram and table below show for each hospital the real cost for consultation, taking into account the bribe 
paid by the patient. In general, in each hospital, corruption makes more expensive the consultation cost of a patient as 
indicated in the graph and table below:  
 
 
Diagram-1. Comparison between the official price and the average bribe during consultation 
 
Table-4. Average Bribe 
List of Hospitals 
Official amounts 
for consultation 
Average amount of bribes 
paid for consultation in 
CFA Francs 
Real total 
amount for 
consultation 
General Hospital  7 000 1548 8 548 
Laquintinie Hospital  1 000 3411 4 411 
Logbaba Hospital  1 000 2286 3 286 
Deido Hospital  1 000 3363 3363 
Bonamoussadi Hospital  1 000 1714 2 714 
Bonassama Hospital  1 000 1636 2 636 
Cité des Palmiers Hospital  1 000 2460 3 460 
Nylon Hospital  1 000 375 1 375 
New-Bell Hospital  1 000 857 1857 
                    Source: Hospitals Survey and authors' calculations 
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We also identified for all hospitals in general some statistics (percentile and mode), useful in determining the 
characteristics of those who pay amounts of bribe. We use the table below to determine these measures:  
 
Table-5. Amount of bribes paid (in CFA7 Francs) per scale 
 Amount of bribes Classes Frequency Percentage 
 0   to 1,000 1 122 30.0 
1,000 to 3,000 2 128 31.4 
3,000 to 5,000 3 102 25.1 
5,000 to 7,000 4 55 13.51 
Total  407 100.0 
 
This table shows the proportion of patients who pay bribes depending on amounts. It shows that the amounts 
mostly paid are in class 1 and 2 (below 1,000 and between 1,000 and 3,000). Class 4 meanwhile shows the 
proportion of the least bribe paid. From the above table, the following statistics were obtained:  
 
Table-6. Some descriptive statistics on amounts of bribe paid (in CFA Francs) 
Characteristics Values Rounded Values 
Mean  2442 2500 
Asymmetry Coefficient (Skewness) 0.335 0.335 
Kurtosis coefficient -0.986 -0.986 
Mode 1936.29 2000 
Percentiles 25 834 1000 
50 2300 2500 
75 3083.33 3000 
 
This table shows the calculated real values and the rounded values. To simplify the presentation, we have rather 
considered the last, insofar as they more reflect the reality of the amounts of bribe paid which are usually whole 
numbers (round), not followed by pennies. Considering for example the mean bribe, we have put it to 2,500 instead 
of 2,442. (In fact, it will be easier in practice for a patient to pay an amount of 2,500 instead of 2,442).  
Bribes corresponding to the 25
th
 and 75
th
 percentiles were selected as reference in our analyzes since Class 2, that 
is, 1,000 to 3,000 that contains these percentiles, is also the modal, the mean and the median class; in other words, 
the mean (2,442), the median (2,300) and the mode (1939.29) are in this class. It therefore appears that 2,000 would 
be nearly the amount of bribe paid the most by patients, and with a positive asymmetry coefficient (0.335), it appears 
that the majority of bribes paid tend to larger amounts as compared to the mean of bribes.    
 
3.2.3. Prevalence Rates during Consultation  
The questionnaire on corruption allowed us to collect information on the phenomenon. However, it was not 
about corruption itself, but about opinions the actors expressed as far as this scourge is concerned. To achieve this 
goal, the questionnaire was administered to patients outside the hospital, so that they are not influenced by hospital 
staff considered as their 'executioners'. We asked each respondent's opinion regarding the affirmation that corruption 
is practiced in the consultation service of the public hospital he/she frequents most. To achieve this goal, we used a 
Likert scale that allowed respondents to have five response options namely, not at all agree, disagree, indifferent, 
agree, and strongly agree. It was for the concerned to choose the option that best describes their feelings about the 
following statement: "The patient who wants to be consulted must pay the official fees plus the bribe." The choice of 
the last two options simply means that for the patient, corruption is practiced during consultation insofar as medical 
doctors abusively use the public responsibility entrusted to them to push their patients to corrupt. We subsequently 
assigned to each of the response options of this scale, a score in  which indicates the level of corruption. The in  
varies from 1 to 5. For instance, if i = 1, the level of corruption is 11  nni . This is the lowest score corresponding 
to the view that the respondent does not agree at all that corruption is practiced in the consulting service of the 
hospital that he/she frequents the most. On the contrary, if i equals to 5, the level of corruption is 55  nni . This is 
the highest score corresponding to the view that the respondent all agrees that corruption is practiced in the hospital 
he/she frequents the most. On this scale, when we go from 11 n  to 55 n , the level of corruption increases. At the 
end of the survey, we counted the number ( if ) of respondents who chose the level of corruption ( 4;5)in i  relative 
to each hospital. The prevalence of corruption during consultation and by hospital was therefore determined as 
follows: 
5
4
i i
i
f n

  , the following table showing the prevalence rates for each hospital. 
 
Table-7. Prevalence rates (in %) during consultation 
HOPITALS LIST  Prevalence Rate  (in %) during consultation 
General Hospital  20.5 
Laquintinie Hospital  76.5 
Logbaba Hospital  19 
Deido Hospital  81.8 
Bonamoussadi Hospital  64.3 
 Continue 
                                                          
7
 1 euro is approximately  equal to 656.56 FCFA 
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Bonassama Hospital  42.4 
Cité des Palmiers Hospital  52 
Nylon Hospital  12.5 
New-Bell Hospital  39.3 
Hospitals  Average  45.36 
                                      Source: Estimations from the survey data 
 
4. Statistical Estimate of Patients’ Characteristics Victims of the Phenomenon 
We will highlight the characteristics of patients’ victims of corruption during consultation through an estimate by 
odds ratios, while identifying the bribe amounts paid by the same patients. The age, income, educational level and 
gender variables were selected for the occasion. The estimate through odds ratios were apprehended by the 
construction of the following 2x2x2
8
 contingency table, this for each of the characteristics studied.  
 
Table-8. Contingency table of 2*2*2 dimension 
Setting amounts below and 
above the percentile i 
Variation of amounts below and 
beyond the percentile j 
Patients’  Characteristics 
       C1 C2 
<Ci 
<Cj 
 
>Cj 
N11 
 
N21 
N12 
 
      N22
 
>Ci 
<Cj 
 
>Cj 
N11 
 
N21 
N12 
 
N22 
                       Sources: Authors’ Conception 
 
N11 and N21 represent respectively the number of people of modality1 (C1) of characteristic C, which bribe 
amounts paid vary above and below the percentile j respectively, given that the amounts were set below and above 
the percentile i. The same interpretation can be applied for modality 2 (C2) for the numbers N12 and N22.These 
different joint distributions Nij were used to calculate the following conditional (partial) odds ratios:  
 ………………………(2) 
Each of the different contingency tables of dimension 2x2 obtained when the amounts of bribe paid are set below 
and beyond the percentile i, contains the different features identified above, and divided into two terms as previously 
explained namely: age (40 and under and over 40 years), income (250,000 and under and over 250,000), educational 
level (not higher and higher), gender (male and female).  The estimates  with their confidence intervals are 
found in Tables 9 and 10 below. 
Highlighting the characteristics of individuals for different amounts of bribe paid was made by setting one of the 
corresponding bribe amounts either to the 25
th 
percentile or to the 75
th 
percentile (which corresponds to the first and 
third quartile respectively),while varying the other based on different characteristics: in each of the situations studied, 
one of the quartiles is regarded as a control variable, and the other as a variable able to explain the characteristics of 
patients for the different amounts of bribe paid. Thus, if we set for instance the third quartile which is 3,000, this will 
lead us to study the characteristics of patients for the amounts of bribe paid, that are above and below this quartile 
(<3,000 or > 3,000), for amounts of bribe paid which are higher or lower to those corresponding to the first quartile.  
However, we note that the study of patients’ features only makes sense for bribes set lower to the third quartile
. This interval includes the amounts of bribe paid between the first and the third quartile , and those 
below the first quartile  
For bribes above this amount (third quartile), the relationships studied will have no meaning insofar as variations 
related to the first quartile (< 1,000 and > 1,000) which are supposed to explain the characteristics of individuals , 
given the amount set beyond the third quartile, do not belong to the interval which corresponds to amounts above 
3,000. On the contrary, these variations belong to the interval for bribes paid which are set below 3,000 as shown in 
the diagram below.   
 
 
Diagram-1. 
                                                          
8Note that each of the characteristics studied has two modalities namely the amounts of bribe paid, set above and below the percentile i (<Ci and >Ci) for the  
control variable Ci, the amounts of bribe paid set below and beyond the percentile j able to explain the characteristics of patients i for the independent variable Cj 
(<Cj and >Cj),   and finally, the characteristics of patients for the dependent variable C  (C1 and C2) 
11 22
/
12 21
iij c
N N
N N
 
/ iij c

 30;Q  1 3;Q Q
 10;Q
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Also, for bribes set higher or lower to the first quartile, the field of study is valid only for bribes paid, only set 
above the first quartile: these bribes allow us to highlight the characteristics of individuals based on changes of bribes 
paid below or above the third quartile (<3,000> 3,000), the latter belonging to the study field.  
Thus, for bribes set above the first quartile , the study is carried out on bribes paid between the first and 
the third quartile on the one hand, and on bribes paid above the third quartile belonging respectively 
to the interval of the study on the other. However, bribes paid set inferior to the first quartile cannot be taken into 
account insofar as this interval does not contain the amounts of bribe above or below the third quartile, and 
which may explain the characteristics of patients. The diagram below well illustrates these different variations. 
 
 
Diagram-2. 
 
Tables 9 and 10 below respectively study the characteristics of patients victims of corruption during consultation 
for bribes paid set below and beyond the 75
th 
and 25
th 
percentiles respectively ,this for amounts of bribe higher or 
lower to those corresponding to the 25
th 
percentile on the one hand, and to the7 5
th 
percentile on the other. 
 
Table-9. Estimate of individuals’ characteristics for amounts of bribe below the75th percentile 
 
 Source: Our estimates from the survey data 
 
Table-10. Estimate of individuals’ characteristics for bribe amounts above the 25th percentile 
 
 Source: Our estimates from the survey data 
 
In Table 9 we find that for bribe amounts set below the 75
th
 percentile, the odds of men are about 120 times 
higher than that of women, to pay amounts less than 1,000 CFA Francs, instead of paying amounts over 1,000 CFA 
Francs. This is also true for people with an income of 250,000 CFA Francs and less (their odds are about 235 times 
higher to pay less than 1,000 CFA Francs instead of paying more than 1, 000 CFA Francs, compared to those with an 
income of more than 250,000 CFA Francs). People without a university level and the young also fall within this 
category, with odds of about 176 and 219 times higher than those with a university level, and the less young 
respectively. An estimate without taking into account the amounts of bribe paid set below or above the 75
th
 percentile 
confirms the above interpretation. In fact, conditional (partial) odds ratios move in the same direction as the marginal 
odds ratios, and this, whatever the characteristic studied. The table below summarizes the characteristics of patients 
based on amounts of bribe paid set below the 75
th
 percentile, for bribes paid higher or lower than those corresponding 
to the 25
th
 percentile.                  
 
 
 
 
 1;Q 
 1 3;Q Q  3;Q 
 10;Q
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Table-11. Characteristics of patients for amounts of bribe paid during consultation, set below the75th percentile 
Amount of bribe paid  
Sex Income  School Level Age 
Male (M1) 
Female (F) 
250,000 and less 
(M2) 
above 250,000 (P1) 
Not superior 
(P2) 
Superior (S) 
40 years and less 
(M3) 
Above  40 years  (P3) 
Less than   1,000 CFA Francs  M1 M2 P2 M3 
Above  1,000 CFA Francs F P1  S P3 
Estimate independently of amounts of 
bribe paid set(<3,000 or >3,000) 
M1 
M2 P2  M3 
Sources: Our conception from the data in Table 9 
 
This table presents and summarizes the profile of patients who pay amounts of bribe below or above 1,000 CFA 
Francs, knowing that the amounts of bribe studied are those below 3,000, while also bringing out the profile of 
patients when amounts of bribe paid, set below and above 3,000 CFA Francs, are not taken into account.  
In table 10 our estimates show that for the amounts of bribe set above the 25
th 
percentile, the odds of men are 
about 1.36 times higher than that of women, to pay amounts less than 3,000 CFA Francs instead of paying amounts 
over 3,000 CFA Francs. On the contrary, for those with less income, their rating is about 5 times higher than those 
with higher income, to pay amounts of more than 3,000 than less than 3,000. It is the same for those who do not have 
a higher Education level who are about 1.4 times more likely, than those who have to pay amounts over 3,000 than 
less than 3,000. The less young fall into this category where the trend is to pay amounts over 3,000 than less than 
3,000. Their odds are about 3.22 times higher than that of the younger. 
However, our estimates show that if we do not take into account the amounts of bribe paid set above the 25
th
 
percentile, women tend more to pay amounts less than 3,000 than those over 3,000 as compared to men. As far as 
income is concerned, we have the same pattern as when the amounts of bribe paid are set beyond the 25
th
 percentile, 
that is, those with lower income will tend to pay amounts of more than 3,000 than amounts less than 3,000. At the 
school level, with an odds ratio substantially equal to 1, we conclude that whatever the school level, the levels of 
bribe paid hardly differ from one category to another. Finally, concerning age, results also confirm the trend that 
when bribes are set beyond the 25
th
 percentile, young people have a higher rating than older people to pay amounts of 
more than 3,000, than less than 3,000. The following table summarizes the profiles of one another, for amounts of 
bribe paid below or above the 75
th
 percentile, as the studied bribe amounts are those above the 25
th
 percentile.      
 
Table-12. Characteristics of patients for amounts of bribe set above the 25th percentile during consultation 
Amount of bribe paid 
Sex Income  School Level Age  
Male (M1) 
Female (F) 
250,000 and less 
(M2) 
Above  250,000 
(P1) 
Not superior (P2) 
Superior (S) 
40 years and less 
(M3) 
Above  40 Years (P3) 
Less than  3,000 CFA Francs M1 P1  S P3 
Above  3,000 CFA Francs F M2 P2 M3 
Estimate independently of amounts of 
bribe paid set(<1,000 or >1,000) 
F
 
P1
 
S et P2  M3 
     Sources: Our conception from data in table 10  
 
As previously stated, this table presents the profile of patients who pay amounts of bribe below or above 3,000 
CFA Francs, knowing that the amounts of bribe paid are those set above 1,000.  It also presents the profile of patients 
when amounts of bribes paid set below and above 1,000CFA Francs are not taken into account. The table below 
summarizes while comparing the two eventualities of tables No.9 and10. 
 
Table-13. Summary of Tables 11 and12 and profiles comparison 
 
Bribes paid set below the 75
th 
percentile 
(<3,000) 
Bribes paid set above 
the 25
th 
percentile (>1,000) 
Characteristics Less than 1,000 Above  1,000 Less than 3,000 Above  3,000 
Sex M1 F  M1 F 
Income  M2 P1  P1 M2 
School level P2 S  S P2 
Age M3 P3  P2 M3 
Estimate with no consideration of set bribes paid 
 
Not taking into account the bribes paid set 
below and above the 75
th 
percentile 
(<3,000> 3,000)  
Not taking into account the  bribes paid set 
beyond and below the 
25
th
 percentile (> 1,000 <1,000) 
Characteristics Less than 1,000 Above  1,000 Less than  3,000 Above  3,000 
Sex M1 F M1 F 
Income  M2 P1 P1 M2 
School level P2 S S et P2 S et P2 
Age M3 P3 P3 M3 
           Sources: Our conception from tables 11 and 12   
 
5. Discussion   
The previous analysis on the characteristics of individuals, victims of the phenomenon, implies the assumption 
that one of the percentiles is set, and the other varies according to the different characteristics selected. In reality, 
bribes are paid simultaneously below the 75
th 
and above the 25
th 
percentile. This approach allows us to consider much 
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the payment zone between the two percentiles (modal class), where the majority of the amounts paid is located. This 
brings us to refine the profiles of individuals, victims of the phenomenon, by detecting at the level of the modal class, 
the dominant modality of the characteristic victim of the phenomenon, given its socio-professional status.  
As far as gender is concerned, when bribes are simultaneously set below and above the afore mentioned 
percentiles, we notice that men pay more bribes below the 25
th 
percentile, and women beyond this percentile
9
. It is 
therefore established that compared to men, women are more representative of the modal class. This contradicts the 
idea that women are less prone to corruption compared to men (Lavallee et al., 2010) and confirms the theory that 
women are more affected by the phenomenon due to their more specialized and frequent health service needs 
(UNDP, 2011). Similarly, for the income characteristic, when bribes are simultaneously set below and above the 75
th
 
and the 25
th
 percentiles, individuals with incomes of 250,000 and less are more likely to pay bribes under 1,000 CFA 
Francs and over 3,000 CFA Francs respectively, none of these amounts being part of the modal class; On the 
contrary, holders of an income of more than 250,000 tend to pay more bribes of more than 1,000 CFA Francs, and 
bribes under 3,000 CFA Francs. This last modality is therefore more representative of the modal class than the first. 
Holding the same reasoning for the age and school level characteristics, it became clear that the older and the more 
educated appear as representative modalities of the modal class. The table below presents for each representative 
category of the modal class, the corresponding socio-professional status. 
 
Table-14. Number and patients’ profiles who pay amounts of bribe corresponding to the modal class given their socio-professional category 
 
  Source: Our estimates from the survey data 
 
We see from this table that as far as gender is concerned, women constitute the most representative modality: 
most of them are senior staffs (80%), sellers (68%) and housewives (100%)
10
 .  For the income characteristic, those 
with more than 250,000 constitute the most representative modality which includes among others, senior staffs 
(60%) and businessmen or contractors (50%). The above 40 years are the representative modality of the modal class 
of the age characteristic, composed essentially of senior staffs (60%). As concerns the school level, the more 
educated are the representative group of the modal class who are mostly senior staffs (100%), control agents (100%) 
and other (57.1%) that can be assimilated to the graduates of the Higher Education working in the informal
11
. In 
general, we find that for all the categories representative of the modal class, senior staffs are included: they are 
usually graduates of Higher Education who earn higher amounts of more than 250,000 CFA Francs, are older than 
forty years, and are female. Here, the theory is confirmed with regard to income because according to the latter, 
patients with the highest incomes would be most victims of the phenomenon (Hunt and Lazlo, 2005). For gender, the 
theory is somewhat debated; in our case with regard to women, they are considered more vulnerable to corruption 
than men, this because of their socio-professional status (senior staffs and traders) which grants them a high income, 
confirming thus the theory that the rich would be the most exposed to the phenomenon. Moreover, they are generally 
more prone to diseases than men, thus requiring them to be much in contact with health professionals and therefore, 
more exposed to bribe payments. Our results refute the theory that the youngest are the most vulnerable to corruption 
because in reality, older people have much money and therefore, holders of highest incomes, thus reconfirming the 
theory that the wealthiest would be most exposed. Similarly, the more educated are the most vulnerable because they 
are also holders of highest incomes, insofar as in majority, they are essentially senior staffs and control agents. 
To  the question of who pays and how much, we can say that the most vulnerable to corruption are mostly the 
wealthiest aged above forty, who are mostly senior staffs, whose education level is quite high, who are female, and 
whose amounts fall within the modal class. This result is the same as the one found earlier when the amounts of bribe 
paid were set below the 75
th
 percentile, this for amounts of bribe paid above 1,000 CFA Francs. 
 
6. Conclusion   
The purpose of this study was to highlight the characteristics of patients who pay amounts of bribe during 
consultation in the various public hospitals of the city of Douala. Initially, these characteristics were studied 
respectively by setting the amounts of bribe paid below and above the 75
th
 and 25
th
 percentiles, while varying one or 
the other percentile, based on the modalities of each characteristic. Secondly, we considered those of individuals 
whose bribe amounts are between the afore mentioned percentiles, to characterize patients victims of the 
phenomenon, given their socio-professional status. In the last case, it appears that the wealthiest, the women, the 
older and the more educated are more likely to corrupt practices than other socio-demographic and socio-
professional categories, this last result corroborating with the one found earlier, when the amounts of bribe paid were 
set below the 75
th
 percentile, this for amounts of bribe paid above 1,000 CFA Francs. We note, however, for all the 
                                                          
9The amounts paid by women can go beyond 3,000 given that according to this hypothesis, the amounts paid must be simultaneously below 3,000 and above 
1,000 thus within the modal class. 
10The housewife status in the studied environment is unique to woman. We can do without it as socio-professional category. From this point of view, this 
percentage should not be taken into account when interpreting the results. 
11Motorcycle drivers (Bendsikineur), taxi drivers , street vendors 
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results,   that the level of the amount of the bribe causes a variation of individuals’ characteristics,   given the 
purchasing power of everyone linked to his/her socio-professional category. This contradicts for instance to some 
extent some theoretical results that do not include the setting of the level of bribe. In fact, the idea that corrupt 
practices would be reserved for certain social classes is discussed because inside the modal class for example, we 
have the profile-type of the corrupt and once out, this profile changes: in fact,  individuals who pay amounts of bribe 
below the 25
th
 percentile, are also different from those who pay beyond the 75
th 
percentile. So, everyone is involved 
in the process, each having his/her own level. No one is spared. 
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Appendix-1. Table no15 : Socio-professional category and level of household income 
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